January 2010
Jordanian Ambassador to Australia, His Excellency Rajab Sukayri: 'The Current Nuclear Dilemma in the Middle East: A Jordanian and Arab Perspective
Dr. Anita Shroot, President of the Jewish Community
Mr. Manny Waks,
Distinguished Members of the Capital Jewish Forum,
Ladies and Gentlemen
At the outset I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the organizers of this event, in particular Mr. Manny Waks, for giving me the opportunity to address such a distinguished group of professionals in a friendly gathering.
My presentation tonight tackles a highly sensitive, but most significant and indispensable, topic in the complex Middle East situation.
Before I address the major questions of this presentation, I wish to explain what this presentation is not. This presentation is not a discussion of the current stand off on the nuclear question between Iran and the Western countries. Nor is this presentation an account of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel’s nuclear capability or its ambiguous nuclear policy. Although the presentation refers to these issues, it is not exclusively devoted to any of them.
In this presentation, I tackle the following questions:
1. Why is the nuclear issue in the Middle East problematic and what makes the Middle East susceptible, from time to time, to such confrontations related to the question of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction?
2. What is the relationship between the nuclear issue and the Peace Process in the region?
3. What can be done to deal with, and try to settle, this problematic situation emanating from the nuclear dilemma in the region?
4. What is the Jordanian, and Arab, perspective on the current nuclear dilemma in the Middle East, and what discrepancies are there between the positions of the major regional actors on this issue?
I certainly realize that it takes a doctoral thesis to fully answer each one of these questions. However, given the limited time available, I tried my best to be as brief as possible in touching upon these issues in the presentation so that we can allow some more time for the question and answer period.
1. Why is the nuclear issue in the Middle East a dilemma?
The current nuclear situation in the Middle East may be described in terms of the following: First, the region has so far failed to achieve universality on the NPT, despite the fact that, with the exception of very few countries, one of them is a major power in the Middle East, all countries of the world have now signed and ratified the treaty; Second, a major state actor in the region is accused by Western states of pursuing a nuclear-weapon program. This has resulted in several UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic and other sanctions on that country in addition to threats of military action against it; Third, although all countries, except for one, in the region are NPT members, recent history of the Middle East has witnessed attempts by several countries to go nuclear, and if the current dangerous situation in the region continues, more countries may consider such an option; Fourth, after 35 UN General Assembly resolutions, over the last three and a half decades, on the necessity of establishing a Nuclear Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, the region has so far failed to achieve that objective; Fifth, this perilous situation, if continued, may result in the following dangers: (1) a nuclear show down between the United States or Israel and Iran, a situation that will highly destabilize the region; (2) a potential nuclear-arms race that would usher in new regional states to the nuclear club; (3) more states in the region will be reluctant to join treaties prohibiting other weapons of mass destruction including the chemical and biological weapons conventions (CWC&BWC), as well as international treaties limiting missile acquisition; (4) with more countries in the region pursuing nuclear weapons programs, the danger of these weapons falling in the hands of terrorists will definitely be much higher; (5) more military imbalances (both conventional and nuclear) may emerge and continue between the states of the region, a situation that would aggravate much further the current security dilemma in the Middle East; (6) finally, the risk of nuclear accidents and miscalculation will certainly be higher if more states in the region acquired nuclear weapons.
I now turn to the second part of the first question, namely, what makes the Middle East susceptible to such a perilous situation? Simply put, the answer may revolve around deep political differences between regional states, particularly the Arab Israeli conflict with the Palestinian problem at its core.
This takes us to the second question on the relationship between the nuclear issue and peace in the region. Should reaching a settlement on the nuclear issue, as Israel argues, wait until comprehensive peace has prevailed in the region? Or, would a solution of the nuclear dilemma, as most Arab countries argue, enhance the potential for a comprehensive peace in the region? This matter is highly controversial. However, the best possible compromise would be to reach a formula by which the two processes could go simultaneously hand in hand. Achieving progress in the peace process would certainly boost efforts toward solving the nuclear security dilemma. And vice versa, any progress in the realm of security, which is a major concern, especially for Israel, would undoubtedly enhance the peace process. In accordance with this compromise, Israel may not be required to give up its nuclear option unless its security is guaranteed. Another significant outcome of this formula is the elimination of the “double-standard” accusation when dealing with the nuclear issue in the Middle East. In addition, any reasonable settlement of the security dilemma in the region must be based on renouncing nuclear weapons by all regional states which will also be required to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All states in the region would accordingly be entitled to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without the risk of deviating highly enriched uranium (HEU) to military purposes. Elimination of nuclear proliferation in a highly volatile region such as the Middle East is the gateway to regional security and stability.
WHAT CAN BE DONE
There are three possible solutions available for dealing with the Middle East nuclear dilemma and solving the problems stemming from it. The first one is economic and other sanctions to be imposed by the UN Security Council on countries indulging in producing, or acquiring through other means, nuclear devices or even developing the know-how for acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The important question is, however, to which extent could sanctions be effective? The answer may not be so encouraging, particularly with the recent examples of North Korea, Iraq and Iran in mind. In addition to their ineffectiveness, sanctions may have a negative impact on the poor, the weakest segment of the society on which sanctions are imposed.
The second option is diplomacy and negotiations. In some examples, such as Libya, negotiations have proved to be successful in reversing the quest for nuclear and other arms of mass destruction. It should be noted, however, that prolonged negotiations without a timeframe may have a negative effect by allowing proliferators to buy time. Therefore, what could be a little more effective is an amalgam, (a mixture) of sanctions and negotiations.
The third option is military action. Although this may be seen by some practitioners as most effective if sanctions and negotiations proved to be leading nowhere, military action could have detrimental effects on regional peace and stability. Moreover, military action could temporarily impede the drive towards producing nuclear arms but may not totally eliminate such programs especially if nuclear facilities are scattered and well protected. Military action may also have a negative societal effect. It would antagonize those segments in the society of targeted countries that are otherwise opposed to their nation’s nuclear arms option. Nevertheless, for enhancing the effectiveness of both sanctions and negotiations, it could be prudent to leave the military option open, provided that it is applied equally to all cases of nuclear proliferation in order to avert the ‘double standard’ accusation.
Now I turn to the final question in this presentation. What is the Jordanian and Arab perspective on the current Middle East nuclear dilemma?
Jordan, along with all Arab countries, is in favour of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region of the Middle East. His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan has repeatedly called for ridding the Middle East of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The late King Hussein, may his soul rest in peace, insisted during the negotiations that produced the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, to incorporate a provision providing for freeing the region of nuclear and other arms of mass destruction. Since 1974, Jordan, Egypt and other Arab states have been sponsoring an annual resolution at the UN General Assembly calling, inter alia, for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. Also the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have for many years been adopting resolutions to this effect.
A NWFZ, if established, would certainly rid the region of the threat of nuclear arms. It would allow all countries in the region to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while placing all nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Moreover, the creation of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East would roll back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred. Most importantly, the protocols attached to such a NWFZ treaty and signed by all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) would provide security assurances to all state parties to the treaty.
A NWFZ would not be an exclusive invention of the Middle East. Past experience tells us that the establishment of such zones in other regions of the world have been most successful and very effective in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. There are currently five NWFZs in the world covering almost the whole Southern Hemisphere. As early as 1967, the NWFZ of Latin America and the Caribbean was established to prohibit production, development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the region. For four decades the Treaty of Tlatelolco has proved to be most effective in preventing nuclear proliferation in that region. The second NWFZ (the Treaty of Rarotonga) was concluded in1985 in the South Pacific. Australia played a leading role in the creation of that zone. Rarotonga was followed in 1995 by the Bangkok Treaty that established a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. In 1996 the African countries succeeded in creating a NWFZ in their continent. The Pelindaba Treaty which entered into force in July last year, has also proved to be most effective. It attracted all NWS to sign protocols attached to the treaty providing security assurances to all states of the continent and undertaking to refrain from deploying or using nuclear devices in the region. The fifth NWFZ was established in 2006 in Central Asia. The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty which entered into force in March, 2009 was concluded by five regional states, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
This success record, however, does not incorporate such regions as South Asia, Northeast Asia and the Middle East.
It might be said that none of the regions that succeeded in establishing NWFZs were as volatile and conflict-ridden as the Middle East. While this is true, it could be argued that the diplomatic history of the processes of establishing NWFZs in those five regions may provide us with most valuable lessons. That rich diplomatic history should be most supportive to the case of the Middle East.
Over the last few decades, especially after convening the 1991 Madrid Conference, a plethora of seminars and informal conferences convened in and outside the region of the Middle East aiming at studying thoroughly the NWFZ option. All these meetings, without exception, have been most supportive to the establishment of a NWFZ or a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. What is lacking, however, is the political will of the states of the region. The NWFZ option that proved to be most successful in the above-mentioned five regions should also be most effective in the Middle East.
Thank you, and the floor is open for your questions or comments.
Mr. Manny Waks,
Distinguished Members of the Capital Jewish Forum,
Ladies and Gentlemen
At the outset I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the organizers of this event, in particular Mr. Manny Waks, for giving me the opportunity to address such a distinguished group of professionals in a friendly gathering.
My presentation tonight tackles a highly sensitive, but most significant and indispensable, topic in the complex Middle East situation.
Before I address the major questions of this presentation, I wish to explain what this presentation is not. This presentation is not a discussion of the current stand off on the nuclear question between Iran and the Western countries. Nor is this presentation an account of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel’s nuclear capability or its ambiguous nuclear policy. Although the presentation refers to these issues, it is not exclusively devoted to any of them.
In this presentation, I tackle the following questions:
1. Why is the nuclear issue in the Middle East problematic and what makes the Middle East susceptible, from time to time, to such confrontations related to the question of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction?
2. What is the relationship between the nuclear issue and the Peace Process in the region?
3. What can be done to deal with, and try to settle, this problematic situation emanating from the nuclear dilemma in the region?
4. What is the Jordanian, and Arab, perspective on the current nuclear dilemma in the Middle East, and what discrepancies are there between the positions of the major regional actors on this issue?
I certainly realize that it takes a doctoral thesis to fully answer each one of these questions. However, given the limited time available, I tried my best to be as brief as possible in touching upon these issues in the presentation so that we can allow some more time for the question and answer period.
1. Why is the nuclear issue in the Middle East a dilemma?
The current nuclear situation in the Middle East may be described in terms of the following: First, the region has so far failed to achieve universality on the NPT, despite the fact that, with the exception of very few countries, one of them is a major power in the Middle East, all countries of the world have now signed and ratified the treaty; Second, a major state actor in the region is accused by Western states of pursuing a nuclear-weapon program. This has resulted in several UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic and other sanctions on that country in addition to threats of military action against it; Third, although all countries, except for one, in the region are NPT members, recent history of the Middle East has witnessed attempts by several countries to go nuclear, and if the current dangerous situation in the region continues, more countries may consider such an option; Fourth, after 35 UN General Assembly resolutions, over the last three and a half decades, on the necessity of establishing a Nuclear Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, the region has so far failed to achieve that objective; Fifth, this perilous situation, if continued, may result in the following dangers: (1) a nuclear show down between the United States or Israel and Iran, a situation that will highly destabilize the region; (2) a potential nuclear-arms race that would usher in new regional states to the nuclear club; (3) more states in the region will be reluctant to join treaties prohibiting other weapons of mass destruction including the chemical and biological weapons conventions (CWC&BWC), as well as international treaties limiting missile acquisition; (4) with more countries in the region pursuing nuclear weapons programs, the danger of these weapons falling in the hands of terrorists will definitely be much higher; (5) more military imbalances (both conventional and nuclear) may emerge and continue between the states of the region, a situation that would aggravate much further the current security dilemma in the Middle East; (6) finally, the risk of nuclear accidents and miscalculation will certainly be higher if more states in the region acquired nuclear weapons.
I now turn to the second part of the first question, namely, what makes the Middle East susceptible to such a perilous situation? Simply put, the answer may revolve around deep political differences between regional states, particularly the Arab Israeli conflict with the Palestinian problem at its core.
This takes us to the second question on the relationship between the nuclear issue and peace in the region. Should reaching a settlement on the nuclear issue, as Israel argues, wait until comprehensive peace has prevailed in the region? Or, would a solution of the nuclear dilemma, as most Arab countries argue, enhance the potential for a comprehensive peace in the region? This matter is highly controversial. However, the best possible compromise would be to reach a formula by which the two processes could go simultaneously hand in hand. Achieving progress in the peace process would certainly boost efforts toward solving the nuclear security dilemma. And vice versa, any progress in the realm of security, which is a major concern, especially for Israel, would undoubtedly enhance the peace process. In accordance with this compromise, Israel may not be required to give up its nuclear option unless its security is guaranteed. Another significant outcome of this formula is the elimination of the “double-standard” accusation when dealing with the nuclear issue in the Middle East. In addition, any reasonable settlement of the security dilemma in the region must be based on renouncing nuclear weapons by all regional states which will also be required to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All states in the region would accordingly be entitled to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without the risk of deviating highly enriched uranium (HEU) to military purposes. Elimination of nuclear proliferation in a highly volatile region such as the Middle East is the gateway to regional security and stability.
WHAT CAN BE DONE
There are three possible solutions available for dealing with the Middle East nuclear dilemma and solving the problems stemming from it. The first one is economic and other sanctions to be imposed by the UN Security Council on countries indulging in producing, or acquiring through other means, nuclear devices or even developing the know-how for acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The important question is, however, to which extent could sanctions be effective? The answer may not be so encouraging, particularly with the recent examples of North Korea, Iraq and Iran in mind. In addition to their ineffectiveness, sanctions may have a negative impact on the poor, the weakest segment of the society on which sanctions are imposed.
The second option is diplomacy and negotiations. In some examples, such as Libya, negotiations have proved to be successful in reversing the quest for nuclear and other arms of mass destruction. It should be noted, however, that prolonged negotiations without a timeframe may have a negative effect by allowing proliferators to buy time. Therefore, what could be a little more effective is an amalgam, (a mixture) of sanctions and negotiations.
The third option is military action. Although this may be seen by some practitioners as most effective if sanctions and negotiations proved to be leading nowhere, military action could have detrimental effects on regional peace and stability. Moreover, military action could temporarily impede the drive towards producing nuclear arms but may not totally eliminate such programs especially if nuclear facilities are scattered and well protected. Military action may also have a negative societal effect. It would antagonize those segments in the society of targeted countries that are otherwise opposed to their nation’s nuclear arms option. Nevertheless, for enhancing the effectiveness of both sanctions and negotiations, it could be prudent to leave the military option open, provided that it is applied equally to all cases of nuclear proliferation in order to avert the ‘double standard’ accusation.
Now I turn to the final question in this presentation. What is the Jordanian and Arab perspective on the current Middle East nuclear dilemma?
Jordan, along with all Arab countries, is in favour of the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region of the Middle East. His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan has repeatedly called for ridding the Middle East of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The late King Hussein, may his soul rest in peace, insisted during the negotiations that produced the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, to incorporate a provision providing for freeing the region of nuclear and other arms of mass destruction. Since 1974, Jordan, Egypt and other Arab states have been sponsoring an annual resolution at the UN General Assembly calling, inter alia, for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. Also the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have for many years been adopting resolutions to this effect.
A NWFZ, if established, would certainly rid the region of the threat of nuclear arms. It would allow all countries in the region to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while placing all nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Moreover, the creation of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East would roll back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred. Most importantly, the protocols attached to such a NWFZ treaty and signed by all Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) would provide security assurances to all state parties to the treaty.
A NWFZ would not be an exclusive invention of the Middle East. Past experience tells us that the establishment of such zones in other regions of the world have been most successful and very effective in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. There are currently five NWFZs in the world covering almost the whole Southern Hemisphere. As early as 1967, the NWFZ of Latin America and the Caribbean was established to prohibit production, development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the region. For four decades the Treaty of Tlatelolco has proved to be most effective in preventing nuclear proliferation in that region. The second NWFZ (the Treaty of Rarotonga) was concluded in1985 in the South Pacific. Australia played a leading role in the creation of that zone. Rarotonga was followed in 1995 by the Bangkok Treaty that established a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. In 1996 the African countries succeeded in creating a NWFZ in their continent. The Pelindaba Treaty which entered into force in July last year, has also proved to be most effective. It attracted all NWS to sign protocols attached to the treaty providing security assurances to all states of the continent and undertaking to refrain from deploying or using nuclear devices in the region. The fifth NWFZ was established in 2006 in Central Asia. The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty which entered into force in March, 2009 was concluded by five regional states, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
This success record, however, does not incorporate such regions as South Asia, Northeast Asia and the Middle East.
It might be said that none of the regions that succeeded in establishing NWFZs were as volatile and conflict-ridden as the Middle East. While this is true, it could be argued that the diplomatic history of the processes of establishing NWFZs in those five regions may provide us with most valuable lessons. That rich diplomatic history should be most supportive to the case of the Middle East.
Over the last few decades, especially after convening the 1991 Madrid Conference, a plethora of seminars and informal conferences convened in and outside the region of the Middle East aiming at studying thoroughly the NWFZ option. All these meetings, without exception, have been most supportive to the establishment of a NWFZ or a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. What is lacking, however, is the political will of the states of the region. The NWFZ option that proved to be most successful in the above-mentioned five regions should also be most effective in the Middle East.
Thank you, and the floor is open for your questions or comments.
